developed the infamous âSuper Gunâ for Iraq, that had focused media attention on the existence of the Mossad assassination teams, resulting in more accountability. Although there had been substantial changes to the organizationâs structure, Saguy knew that Mossad would always be surrounded by controversy.
The new and more streamlined Mossad with its eight departments would continue to provide his country with intelligence resources of the highest caliber, although Saguy admitted that the institute had not always been successful in its endeavors. He recalled his governmentâs embarrassment when Mossad mistakenly assassinated a Swedish national. Then, there was the failed attempt to eliminate Khalid Meshaal by injecting the Palestinian Hamas leader with poison. But it was Mossadâs failure to provide adequate protection to Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin against Yigal Amirâs deadly attack that had resulted in leadership changes which, in turn, had paved the way for Saguyâs ascent to his current position and the unenviable task with which he was now faced.
Israelâs enemies had continued to arm, the threat of a nuclear war becoming more real by the day. Mossad became increasingly preoccupied with the necessity to maintain intelligence access by penetrating its neighborsâ defenses, and it was the success of these missions which had provided the information revealing the growing nuclear arms build-up amongst the Moslem nations. The director did not need to refer to his database to refresh his mind. The Iranians, he knew, now boasted their new Zelzal-3Â missiles could destroy any target within fifteen hundred kilometers with a one thousand kilogram warhead and would soon test the first of their North Korean Nodong-2âs, capable of delivering their deadly payload as far as Germany and Western China.
Of even greater concern was confirmation that Iran now had at least fifteen nuclear material sites. The list went despairingly on; Saddam Husseinâs arsenal contained not only deadly nerve gases and chemicals, but also eleven confirmed nuclear facilities left undestroyed by the Gulf War.
Now, it would seem, Indonesia, the worldâs largest Moslem nation, wished to enter the Arms Race. Mossad had become alarmed when the Indonesians acquired all thirty-nine warships from the former Soviet-backed, East German Fleet. Alarmed by this shift in policy, and unable to penetrate the Jakarta-based government with his intelligence teams, Director Saguy had depended on other Israeli resources to gather information regarding the Indonesianâs long-term strategies and military ambitions.
This had not been so difficult. Indonesia remained heavily in debt to both the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Conditions precedent in all financial loan agreements required transparency in the debtor nationâs fiscal policies and, through Mossad-related resources, Saguy had managed to obtain the information he required. Senior officers within both the World Bank and the IMF reported directly to Mossad, and this provided Saguy with a clear overview of Indonesiaâs future military intentions through the monetary monitoring processes.
He had become further alarmed with the growth of militancy amongst the powerful, and previously apolitical, Indonesian Moslem movements, the Directorâs concerns growing even further with the discovery of a developing relationship between Islamic terrorist groups, headed by the Saudi, Osama bin Ladam and the powerful Indonesian Mufti Muharam movement. Saguy had flown to Washington with evidence of bin Ladamâs plans to expand his terrorist movementâs activities to include Indonesia and Malaysia, where training camps could be conveniently disguised by Moslem elements within those nationsâ military hierarchy.
Saguy had been convincing in his arguments. Mossad teams had infiltrated a number of bin Ladamâs terrorist training camps in
Karen Hawkins, Holly Crawford